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Since the last report on developments in Virginia's law of
administrative procedure,' both her General Assembly and her
courts have been busy making new law. This year's General
Assembly revamped the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), and
made adjustments to laws regulating the periods in which agencies
must decide certain types of licensing cases and promulgate certain
procedural regulations. Meanwhile, the courts of the Commonwealth
were active in the field, addressing open questions concerning the
following subjects: rulemaking, due process, evidence, timeliness,
and judicial review.
I. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO VIRGINIA'S FOIA
Among the developments in Virginia administrative law wrought
legislatively in 1999, the most noticed was a revision of FOIA. Much
fanfare accompanied the revisions through the General Assembly,
where it passed both houses unanimously. The Governor added his
approval in the same cooperative spirit, negotiating only minor
changes affecting his estate. Legislation so widely appreciated is
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unlikely to mandate substantial change, and the revision is very
much old FOIA in new clothes. On the other hand, consensus across
so wide a swath of interests is itself noteworthy, and fresh state-
ments of existing law about which all can agree are no small
accomplishment for the special joint committee from which the
FOIA revision issued.2
Virginia's FOIA establishes general rights of access to govern-
ment records and meetings along with concomitant government
duties of disclosure and admittance, and then provides numerous
exclusions. While much rearranging occurred in the new version, the
general rights are still intact. The exclusions remain legion,3 and
only a few potentially significant changes survived the legislative
process. Those few changes are discussed below.
A Records in an Information Age
There is a risk for legal drafters in attempting to be specific and
comprehensive at the same time. Generally, the constitutional
imperative of separation of powers obliges courts to pay deference
to legislatures.4 A particular form of this deference is a presumption,
often resorted to by judges, that legislative drafters intended to
write what is written in a law. Thus, something not appearing in a
list of other things of the same sort is generally presumed to have
been omitted by design, not oversight. Nevertheless, the drafters of
Virginia's FOIA attempted to encompass all manner of writings and
data within the definition of public record by enumerating various
forms in which information might be recorded in the course of the
people's business. Formerly, the records to which FOIA established
a general right of public access included, for example, all written or
printed books, papers, letters, documents, maps and tapes, photo-
graphs, films, sound recordings, reports, or other material, regard-
2. For to articulate sweet sounds together
Is to work harder than all these, and yet
Be thought an idler by the noisy set
Of bankers, schoolmasters, and clergymen
The martyrs call the world.
WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Adam's Curse, st. I., in IN THE SEVEN WOODS (1904), reprinted in
W.B. YEATS, THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 78 (1956).
3. Seventy exclusions are now collected at one place in the law. See VA. CODEANN. § 2.1-
342.01 (Cum. Supp. 1999). Seven more, all pertaining to records in the custody ofcriminal law
enforcement agencies, are now set out in the section following. See id. § 2.1-342.2 (Cum. Supp.
1999).
4. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 8 (1975).
5. See, e.g., Turner v. Wexler, 244 Va. 124, 127, 418 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1992).
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less of physical form or characteristics, prepared, owned, or in the
possession of a public body or any employee or officer of a public
body in the transaction of public business.6
The new version of FOIA attempts to improve upon that
description, taking into account the new technologies of information
storage. The new definition of "public record" includes:
All writings and recordings which consist of letters, words or numbers, or
their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing,
photostatting [sic], photography, magnetic impulse, optical or magneto
optical form, mechanical or electronic, recording or other form of data
compilation, however stored, and regardless of physical form or
characteristics, prepared or owned by, or in the possession of a public body
or its officers, employees, or agents in the transaction of public business.'
In light of the General Assembly's expressly stated intention
that the provisions of FOIA be construed to promote openness and
access,8 reviewing courts ought to take this laundry list as exem-
plary, rather than as exclusive, so that whatever the form of a
record might be, its form alone cannot remove the record from
FOIA's application.
The custodians of databases that store both information that
FOIA makes available to the public and that which FOIA exempts
are expected to respond to requests by excising the exempt fields as
necessary.9 The revision makes clear that excising an exempt field
from a database does not result in a new public record."l A provision
prohibiting government offices from designing databases so that
records available to the public could not be inextricably combined
with records exempt from FOIA disclosure could be found in an
early draft of the revision, but was not included in the version
passed into law.1
B. Eligible Record Requesters
The new version makes clearer the procedures for both requesting
public records and responding to such requests. A common miscon-
ception has now been put to rest. A request for public records need
6. See VA. CODEANN. § 2.1-341 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
7. Id. (Cur. Supp. 1999).
8. See id. § 2.1-340.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
9. See id. § 2.1-342(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
10. See id. § 2.1-342(H) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
11. See Maria J.KM Everett, FOJA -Open Records Comparison (Current Law vs Proposed
Redraft) HJR 187 (1998) (visited July 4, 1999) <http//dls.state.va.us/hjr187/compar.htm>.
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not refer explicitly to FOIA; its provisions, including FOIA's
deadlines for responses by the government, apply without invocation
by name.'" Nothing in FOIA says that a request must be made in
writing, but nothing in FOIA forbids the imposition of that require-
ment either. 13 The new version does not make clear that a request
must be honored, even when that request is not made in writing.14
A provision to that effect also could be found in an early draft, but
was not included in the version passed into law. 5
Nor does FOJA require anyone to present identification when
making a request. However, because FOJA affords rights of access
only to citizens of the Commonwealth, representatives of newspa-
pers and magazines with circulation in the Commonwealth, and
representatives of radio and television stations broadcasting into the
Commonwealth, 16 government representatives seem invited by
FOTA to make proof of eligibility a condition precedent to perfor-
mance of their duty to disclose. 7 While a requester's name and
address might sometimes be helpful for the government custodian
striving to obey FOIA's command, for example, where disclosure
cannot be effected immediately and "over the counter," general
schemes by which government offices attempt to verify the neces-
sary citizenship or media relationships for every records request
cause undue inconvenience and invasion of privacy. It is far better
for open government in the Commonwealth that ten foreigners
receive public records than one interested Virginian be discouraged.
Refusing to provide foreigners access to public records in which
they have a sufficient stake may well implicate a law higher than
FOIA. According to the U.S. Constitution, "Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States,"" and "any State [shall not] deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 9 Neither
federal provision compels Virginia to establish a right of access to
public documents, but both limit the circumstances under which
Virginia can reserve legal rights for the exclusive enjoyment of her
12. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See Everett, supra note 11.
16. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
17. See Statewide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Convention Ctr. Auth., 635
A.2d 691, 698 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (holding that a foreign corporation had no right under
the Pennsylvania Right to Know Act to examine public documents).
18. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
19. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
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citizens. Refusing to grant some journalists access to public records
simply because their work is not circulated or broadcast inside
Virginia may implicate the same higher law.2" In addition, the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press operates against
state oppression through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That has been clear since at least 1931.1 Discrimina-
tion against some news-gathering organizations because they do not
deliver news inside the state invites judicial scrutiny with reference
to the Equal Protection Clause.22 Restricting the right of access
provided by FOIA-to Virginia citizens and locally operated media
can hardly be justified on the ground that responding to requests for
records from foreigners would overwhelm limited government
resources. After all, FOIA authorizes recoupment of reasonable
compliance costs,' and government officials cannot reasonably fear
inundation by a large volume of requests from persons or media
lacking substantial ties with the Commonwealth.24
Where there is no harm, there is no foul. If any foreigner desiring
to exploit FOIA access circumvents the limitation by recruiting a
Virginia agent or surrogate, that violation is not likely to inconven-
ience anyone so as to create a legally cognizable injury.25 Virginia
does not condition the right of FOIA access on a proper purpose or
motive, thus a Virginia surrogate might reasonably insist on FOIA
access in aid of another. On the other hand, any interpretation
allowing surrogates to obtain for foreigners that to which the statute
does not entitle them frustrates the obvious intent behind the
restriction. It is troublesome that, although FOIA does not expressly
require requesters to reveal their reasons for wanting to examine
government documents, attention by the government to the statute's
20. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1997)
(holding unconstitutional, by reference to the Commerce Clause, a state law imposing a
heavier burden on producers from other states).
21. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
22. Cf Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (holding that it is
unconstitutional to deny nonemergency medical treatment to indigents from other states);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,19-20 (1956) (holding that it is unconstitutional to discriminate
against indigent criminal defendants who request trial transcripts for use in their appeals).
23. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342(F) (Curn. Supp. 1999).
24. While the majority of state FOIAs permit access without restriction based on who or
what is applying for access, Virginia is far from being the only state to restrict FOIA access
to its citizens. See, e.g., GA. CODEANN. § 50-18-70(b) (Michie 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-2
(West 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1999); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 66.2. (West 1959 & Cum. Supp.
1999).
25. We are indebted to our colleague, John Barden, for this practical and insightful
observation.
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limitation of access to Virginia citizens might prompt a general
program of examining a requester's motive so that surrogacy of this
sort may be discovered and frustrated. It would be better for the
government to abjure investigation of a requester's citizenship,
nexus, or motives.26
C. Police Blotters and the Like
The most contentious issues resolved in the 1999 revision ofFOIA
concerned incident reports collected by law enforcement agencies.
Previously, law enforcement agencies were obliged to produce
criminal incident information on request, that is, a general descrip-
tion of criminal activity reported to the agency, including the date
and general location of the alleged crime, the name of the investigat-
ing officer, and general descriptions of any injuries to person, theft,
or damage to property. On the other hand, FOIA specifically
prohibited the disclosure of the identity of any witness who provided
information on the condition of anonymity, and left to the discretion
of the authorities whether to make public the identity of any
undercover officer or investigative technique."
A field test of FOIA compliance conducted last year by a consor-
tium of Virginia news gatherers revealed widespread failures or
refusals by local governments and their agencies to comply with
FOIA requests. 29 Among the more egregious failures were those
arising from requests for criminal incident information. Only sixteen
percent of Virginia's city and county law enforcement offices
complied with a request for criminal incident information." Without
changing much of the relevant substance, this year's revision
attempts to make clearer what must be released on request, what
may be released (in the discretion of the authorities), and what must
be withheld, regardless of the inclination of the local authorities. The
26. See Atchison v. Hospital Auth. of St. Marys, 265 S.E.2d 801 (Ga. 1980); Ryan v.
Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Auth., 448 A.2d 669 (Pa. 1982).
27. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-341 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
28. Disclosure of some information of this sort is otherwise prohibited by VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-11.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
29. See Mark DiVincenzo, More Departments Give Less Information with Crime Incident
Reports, ROANOKE TIIES & WORLD NEWS, Nov. 1, 1998, at A6; C.S. Murphy, Freeing Public
Data: Statewide Newspaper Survey Shows Frontline Workers Need FOI Training, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 2, 1998, at Al.
30. See Murphy, supra note 29, at Al. From the governments and agencies of 135 cities
and counties, testers requested five documents to which FOIA guarantees public access.
Local government, properly complying with FOIA requests 58% of the time, generally
complied more than local law enforcement. See id.; see also DiVincenzo, supra note 29, atA6.
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revision collects the relevant portions of FOIA in a new and separate
section pertaining exclusively to criminal incident information.3' It
reiterates the duty of law enforcement agencies to provide, on
request, general information about felony offenses brought to their
attention, and it preserves exceptions for ongoing investigations,
undercover personnel and procedures, witness anonymity, and the
privacy or safety of victims and others.32 The revision attempts to
make sufficiently clear that the names of persons who have been
arrested must be released to the press or anyone else who asks.3
Finally, it makes clear that any attorney for the Commonwealth is
a law enforcement official when it comes to the custody and release
of information about crimes.
34
In addition to information pertaining to reports of felonies, FOIA
now addresses information related to reports of nonfelonious or
noncriminal incidents. In Tull v. Brown,35 the Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed a decision that a journalist had no right under
FOIA to a sheriffs tape recording of a telephone call to 911 for
31. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
32. See id.
33. The names of'persons maybe withheld ifit wouldjeopardize an investigation or if the
person arrested is a juvenile. See id. § 2.1-342.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
34. See id. § 2.1-342.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999). However, itis not as clear who else must be.
The term "law-enforcement official" was not defined in earlier versions of FOIA, and is not
defined generally in the new version. Sheriffs and chiefs of police seem to agree with the
Virginia Press Association that they and their subordinates are those to whom FOIA refers
when it speaks of "law-enforcement officials." See Murphy, supra note 29, at Al. Other
officials of the Commonwealth also investigate conduct that may be a felony, for example,
subordinates of the Board of Realtors or the State Bar who respond to complaints against
persons holding professional licenses. These investigators and their supervisors routinely
exhibit the same or greater solicitude for the privacy of the subjects of their inquiries as did
the subordinates and supervisors of police and sheriffs departments during last summer's
tests. See id. Even keeping in mind the General Assembly's explicitly stated intention that
"the provisions of[FOIA]... be liberally construed to promote an increased awareness by all
persons of government activities and afford every opportunity to citizens to witness the
operations of government," VA. CODEANN. § 2.1-340.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999), doubt lingers that
administrative investigators will regard themselves as bound in the same way as sheriffs and
police by the FOIA provisions pertaining to criminal incident information. By contrast, FOIA
leaves to the discretion of certain other non-police investigative authorities disclosure of
records and notes relating to their cases. See id. § 2.1-342.01(A)(1) (Cum Supp. 1999) (relating
to ABC Board, Lbttery Department, and Charitable Gaming and Racing Commission
investigations); id. § 2.1-342.01(A)(13) (Cum. Supp. 1999) (relating to Department of Health
Professions and other health regulatory board investigations); id. § 2.1-342.01(A)(26) (Cum.
Supp. 1999) (relating to discrimination cases investigated by the Department of Personnel
and Training); id. § 2.1-342.01(A)(31) (Cum. Supp. 1999) (relating to the investigation of
Virginia Human Rights Act discrimination cases); id. § 2.1-342.01(A)(32) (Cum. Supp. 1999)
(relating to investigations of licensees by the Department of Social Services).
35. 255 Va. 177, 494 S.E.2d 855 (1998).
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emergency rescue services.3' Not satisfied with a transcript of the
tape supplied by the sheriff, several news media organizations
sought a declaratory judgment of their right under FOIA to the
actual tape.37 On appeal, the supreme court agreed with the media
that the 911 tape was a record within the meaning of FOIA, but then
found it exempt from disclosure under a law that requires a sheriff
to maintain records ofnoncriminal incident reports necessary for the
efficient operation of a law enforcement agency.3 The new version
of FOTA fashions a Solomonic compromise by cutting the tape of a
911 rescue call in two: some of it must be released to the media, but
not those portions "containing identifying information of a personal,
medical or financial nature.., where the release of such information
would jeopardize the safety or privacy of any person.
D. Working Papers
In the past, memoranda, working papers, and correspondence
held by or requested from members of the General Assembly or the
Division of Legislative Services were not subject to mandatory
disclosure, but might be disclosed at the discretion of the custodian,
when disclosure was not otherwise prohibited by law.4" What is
meant by memoranda, working papers, and correspondence held by
a member of the General Assembly was clear enough, especially
when compared with what might be meant by memoranda, working
papers, and correspondence requested from a member of the General
Assembly. If the latter phrase referred to FOJA requests to members
36. See id. at 179, 494 S.E.2d at 856.
37. See id. at 181, 494 S.E.2d at 857.
38. See id. at 183,494 S.E.2d at 858. This exemption was reenacted in 1997 at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-1722 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342.2(G)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1999). The Virginia Coalition for Open
Government overstates the impact of this addition to FOIA when it reports that the new law
overturns a 911-emergency tape decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia. See Virginia
Overhauls its FOIA, 3 NEWS 2 (May 1999). While the Coalition does not refer to Tull v. Brown
explicitly, that case is the only case to date in the Supreme Court of Virginia that has
produced a decision about the import of FOA on a 911-emergency tape. Because the case
before the supreme court in Tull was one in which a transcript had been tendered by the
sheriff, the only issue involved was access to the recording itself and not to the substance of
the call. See Tull, 255 Va. at 181, 494 S.E.2d at 857. The supreme court was therefore in no
position to determine what content could be withheld without FOIA violation, in the sense
that content is addressed in the new version of FOLk. It is debatable that the General
Assembly has now given to the media what the court denied it in Tull. See id. at 184, 494
S.E.2d at 859. From now on, representatives of the news media are unlikely to exhibit the
same level of interest in 911 tapes from which have been redacted all that might jeopardize
any person's privacy.
40. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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for writings not in their possession, then it was redundant, as FOIA
requires only custodians-that is, officers or bodies in possession of
records-to share them on request.41 Otherwise, the phrase seemed
to exempt from publication writings transmitted by members of the
General Assembly to other government officers or public bodies, but
only if the other government officer or body requested the transmis-
sion. For example, any correspondence initiated by the delegate or
senator but directed to another public officer or a public body would
not be exempt by this subsection.
The new version of FOIA makes clearer the thrust and scope of
this disclosure exemption. It could be clearer still. The new version
covers the working papers and correspondence of the members of the
General Assembly and Division of Legislative Services.42 It therefore
no longer ought to matter in whose possession they may be found, or
who initiated their transmission. Any doubts are dispelled by the
definition of working papers now incorporated in the subsection:
"records prepared by or for an above-named public official for his
personal or deliberative use."43 Memoranda no longer appears among
the exempted forms of writing, but it was probably redundant, being
reasonably encompassed by the ordinary meaning of correspondence.
The new version of FOTA also makes clear that a document other-
wise subject to disclosure cannot be rendered exempt by attaching
it to working papers or correspondence exempt from disclosure."
Besides the working papers of the members of the General
Assembly and the Division of Legislative Services,45 FOTA previously
exempted from disclosure those "held or requested by the Office of
the Governor or Lieutenant Governor."46 Negotiations in conjunction
with the Governor's signing of the new FOTA law led to a more
definite statement of who, besides the Governor, comprises his office,
at least for the purposes of this exemption. According to the new
version of FOTA, the Governor's "Office" includes "his chief of staff,
counsel, director of policy, Cabinet Secretaries, and the Director of
the Virginia Liaison Office, as well as those to whom the Governor
has delegated his authority pursuant to § 2.1-39.1," in addition to
41. See id. § 2.1-342 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
42. See id. §§ 2.1-341.2, -342 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
43. Id. § 2.1-342.01(6) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
44. See id. § 2.1-342(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
45. With respect to the General Assembly, a member is presumably a Senator or
Delegate, but it is not so clear who might qualify as a member of the Division of Legislative
Services.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
1999]
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the Governor himself.4 7 The line of exemption for working papers
relating to the Governor and his office seems to be drawn neatly,
reflecting what the Supreme Court of Virginia would find dictated
by the Virginia constitution's protection of executive power from
legislative invasion.4"
Because the new version of FOIA specifies the composition of only
the Governor's office, it is logical to conclude that the law does not
contemplate an office for any of the other executives whose working
papers and correspondence are also the subjects of this exemption.
This could mean that FOIA does not afford the same protection to
working papers prepared for an immediate subordinate of the
Lieutenant Governor, the Attorney General, a mayor, or a college
president as it affords those prepared for such officials as the
Secretary of Education or the Director of the Virginia Liaison Office.
Such an interpretation would comply with the stated intention of the
General Assembly that FOIA be liberally construed in favor of
access,49 but it would run afoul of the Constitution of Virginia, at
least with respect to the working papers of the immediate subordi-
nates of the Lieutenant Governor or the Attorney General. The
better view is that the scope of the new working papers exclusion
was intended to be the same for all three constitutional officers. No
such constitutional imperative obliges similar treatment for mayors,
college presidents, or other chief executives and their subordinates.
In the interest of more open and transparent government, the
General Assembly might well treat them as differently under FOIA
as the nature of their executive powers permits.
The new version of Virginia's FOIA also continues to exclude from
disclosure certain written materials compiled specifically for use in
litigation or concerning any matter properly the subject of a closed
meeting. 0 Previously, the exemption encompassed "memoranda,
working papers and records"; it now covers "legal memoranda and
47. Id. § 2.1-342.01(A)(6) (Cure. Supp. 1999). The new version of the working papers
exemption continues to protect the working papers and correspondence of the Attorney
General, mayors, the chief executive officers of other political subdivisions, and presidents
or other chief executive officers of state-supported institutions of higher education. See id.
48. "The legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct,
so that none exercise the powers properly belonging to the others." VA. CONST. art. III, § 1;
see Taylor v. Worrell Enter., Inc., 242 Va. 219, 224, 409 S.E.2d 136, 139-40 (1991) (plurality
opinion) (stating that the General Assembly intended to exclude from FOIA disclosure the
Governor's itemized telephone bills which, if disclosed, could interfere with the Governor's
execution of the duties of his office).
49. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-340.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
50. See id. §§ 2.1-342.01(A)(8), -344 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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other work product.""1 On its face, the new version of this particular
exemption hardly makes more public by making less exempt.5 2 A
separate exclusion pertains to the written communications of city,
county and town attorneys.53 In the past, FOIA excluded the
opinions of such counselors; now it excludes their "advice."54 This,
too, hardly bespeaks of substantial change.5
E. Notice of Meetings
In addition to the right of citizens and journalists to see most
government documents, FOIA contains a requirement that govern-
ment conduct most of its business in scheduled meetings open to the
public.56 That requirement has not changed in the 1999 revision.
What has changed is the requirement for government to give
adequate notice of meetings so as to provide citizens and journalists
with an opportunity to exercise their right to attend.57 Before the
1999 revisions, FOIA charged government officials with the duty of
providing prior notice of a meeting subject to FOIA only on request.58
Now, government officials must display a notice in a prominent
public place or in the relevant government office.59 If the meeting
was previously scheduled, the notice must be given at least three
working days before the day of the meeting.0 If the meeting is called
on short notice or in an emergency, notice to the public must occur
contemporaneously with notice to the participating members
themselves. 6' Three days is not much notice; it is hardly convenient
notice conducive to public participation. The public should be alerted
by a government body at the same time it alerts its own members,
whether the meeting is foreseeable or not.
51. Compare id. § 2.1-342(G) (Repl. Vol. 1995), with id. § 2.1-342.Ol(A)(8) (Cure. Supp.
1999).
52. On the other hand, the new version usefully makes clear that a writing or recording
otherwise subject to disclosure is not rendered excludable simply because it was reviewed or
discussed in a closed meeting. See id. § 2.1-342.01(14) (Cum, Supp. 1999).
53. See id. § 2.1-342.01(7) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
54. See id.
55. Both old and new versions exempted any other writing protected by the attorney-
client privilege. Compare id. § 2.1.342(B)(5) (Repl. Vol. 1995) with id. § 2.1.342.01(A)(7) (Cum.
Supp. 1999).
56. See id. § 2.1-343 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
57. See id. (Cum. Supp. 1999).
58. See id. (Repl. Vol. 1995).
59. See id. (Cum. Supp. 1999).
60. See id. § 2.1-343(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
61. See id. § 2.1-343(D) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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The revision does not explicitly require government to give the
public notice of meetings through electronic media, but encourages
such practice.62 At first blush, this might seem a very small step,
especially when viewed in light of the direction found in the revision
for virtual attendance by members employing electronic means.
This nondirective approach is probably warranted, however, in light
of the differences in resources and sophistication among the wide
variety of the government bodies subject to FOIA. A number of state
agencies and departments maintain sophisticated Internet sites and
publish notices of their meetings on the World Wide Web. The
Commonwealth Calendar' is an ambitious attempt to attract the
placement of announcements of any meetings open to the public on
one Web site and many government bodies use it to their advantage.
Imposing a duty to publish meeting notices by electronic as well as
other means is reasonable only for government bodies suitably
equipped and staffed, and many of those obviously need no such
goad. Anything more than encouragement might well be counterpro-
ductive for public bodies still hesitating to venture into electronic
communications with the public.
F. Going Closed
While FOIA insists that most meetings of government bodies be
open to the public and the media,65 the law permits meetings about
certain sensitive matters in the absence of both.66 The revision does
not materially alter that scheme, but it does address the procedure
by which a public body shifts in the course of a meeting from a
session open to the public to a session from which the public may be
excluded. Previously, shifting from an open session to a closed
session depended on a successful motion in which the purpose of the
closed session was specifically stated and the substance of the
matters to be discussed were reasonably identified. According to
the revision, a meeting can now go from open to closed session only
after a successful motion in which the subject matter of the closed
62. See id. § 2.1-343(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
63. See id. § 2.1-343.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
64. Commonwealth Calendar (visited July 4, 1999) <httpi/www.vipnet.orgcalendar
divide.htm>. VIPNet is a public-private cooperative venture to enhance public access to
government information. See VIPNet History (visited Sept. 1, 1999) <http-/www.vip
net.org/vipnet/history.html>; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-359 to -370 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
65. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-343 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
66. See id. § 2.1-344 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
67. See id. § 2.1-344.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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session is identified, its purpose stated, and the applicable FOIA
exemption specifically referenced. 8
The constitutional imperative derived from a theory of separation
of powers compels courts to presume that when the General
Assembly changes the wording of a statute, it intends the change to
have some effect.69 Prudence ordinarily prompts the rest of us to
adopt the same presumption. Nevertheless, here, only adverbs are
changed: where once the substance of matters to be discussed in
closed session had to be reasonably identified, now the subject
matter need only be identified; where once the purpose of going into
closed session had to be specifically referenced, now it is the FOIA
exemption.70 Neither the deletion of a reasonableness qualification
nor the migration of a specificity qualification ought to be assigned
much importance. These changes best convey an appreciation of how
difficult it is to communicate specifically enough to persuade that
secrecy is warranted, without letting the cat out of the bag and
making the FOIA exception useless.7
G. Consulting Counsel
When litigation loomed, the previous FOIA exception permitted
a public body to meet in closed session so as to consult with legal
counsel or take a briefing from staff or consultants. v2 The revision
narrows this exception by insisting that the threat of lawsuit be real
and immediate.v3 A closed session is no longer warranted merely
because an attorney is present or consulted. From now on, if a
known party has not yet sued or made a specific threat to sue, either
the public body or its counsel must have a reasonable basis for
otherwise believing suit will be commenced by a known party.74
68. See id. (Cure. Supp. 1999).
69. See Southern Ry. Co. v. United States Cas. Co., 136 Va. 475, 118 S.E. 266 (1923); see
also SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.30 (5th ed. 1993).
70. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-344.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995), with id. (Cum. Supp. 1999).
71. William Strunk, Jr. and E.B. White advised, "Do not construct awkward adverbs.
Adverbs are easy to build. Take an adjective or a participle, add -ly and behold! You have an
adverb. But you'd probably be better off without it." WILL1i STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE
ELEMENTS OF STYLE 75 (3d ed. 1979).
72. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-344(A)(7) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
73. See id. (Cum. Supp. 1999).
74. See id.
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11 Homework for the Newly Appointed or Elected
FOIA previously directed the administrator or legal counsel of a
public body subject to FOIA to promptly furnish a copy of FOIA to
anyone "elected, reelected, appointed, or reappointed" as a member
of the public body.75 Now, the revision also requires public officials
to read and familiarize themselves with the provisions of FOIA."6
There is a very old English proverb that "You may lead a horse to
the river, but he will drink when and what he pleases."77 Having
previously caused FOIA to be brought to the attention of the
Commonwealth's officials, the General Assembly now makes it more
clear why FOIA was placed directly on their laps.78
I. Judicial Review
The revision adds three noteworthy specifications for judicial
review. First, the burden of proof is now explicitly imposed on a
public body that relied on an exemption to deny access. 79 Ordinarily,
a presumption of regularity imposes the burden on the party
challenging a government ruling.80 According to Virginia's Admini-
strative Procedure Act ("APA"), for example, "The burden shall be
75. Id. § 2.1-341.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
76. See id. § 2.1-341.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
77. GEORGE HERBERT, JACULA PRUDENTUM (1640), quoted in EMILY MORRISON BECK,
BARTLETT'S FAMILA4R QUOTATIONS 160, at n.3 (5th ed. 1980).
78. See generally Little v. Virginia Retirement Sys., 28 Va. Cir. 411 (Richmond City 1992),
affd sub nom. RF&P Corp. v. Little, 247 Va. 309, 440 S.E.2d 908 (1994). The circuit court's
comment is instructive:
The Court believes that the evidence clearly demonstrates that Ms. Epps
consciously chose to remain ignorant of key requirements of the VFOIA. Contrary
to her assertion in her Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Reconsider, Ms.
Epps's ignorance of the VFOIA reflected more than just an absence of a
"photographic memory." Her uncontradicted testimony was that what familiarity
she had with the VFOIA arose not from her current position as Chairperson of the
VRS, but from a position with the Attorney General's Office. Given the public
responsibilities which are cast upon agency heads, this continues to strike the
Court as a remarkable admission. Although her Memorandum argues otherwise,
the ignorance Ms. Epps revealed through her conduct and her testimony was not
the result of innocent confusion arising from the complexities of the VFOIA_
There is nothing complex about the requirement that members of public bodies
be provided with copies of the VFOIA
Little, 28 Va. Cir. at 441.
79. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-346(E) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
80. See Hladys v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 145,366 S.E.2d 98 (1988); Convalescent Care,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. Cir. 107 (Richmond City 1996); Corinthia Enter. v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 22 Va. Cir. 545 (Loudoun County 1988); BERNARD ScHwARTZ, ADMINISTRA-
TWVE LAW § 3.17 (2d ed. 1984).
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upon the party complaining of agency action to designate and
demonstrate the error of law subject to review by the court."81 In
cases for review of agency decisions pertaining to FOIA, the revision
now places the burden of defending refusal of access on the public
body or officer.8 2 This reversal of fortune for government defendants
ought to be viewed as a measure of the importance placed by the
General Assembly on opening up most of the Commonwealth's
operations to public view. Second, the revision now makes it clear
that failure of a public body to comply with FOIA procedures is
presumed to be a violation of FOIA by a reviewing court.8 3 If the
procedural error caused no harm, it will be up to the government
defendant to prove it. Third, the revision removes what doubt might
remain after RF&P Corporation v. Little" that the General Assembly
intends the standard of proof in judicial review of FOIA cases to be
that of the preponderance of the evidence.85
II. OTHER LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Penalties for Delay of Game in Licensing
An important development emerged from the General Assembly's
1999 session with considerably less fanfare than did the revision of
Virginia's FOIA. Chapter 10 of title 63.1 imposes a licensing
requirement for nongovernmental child welfare facilities such as
adoption agencies, foster homes, day care centers, and nursery
schools.8 6 Formerly, section 63.1-200 provided that if the Commis-
sioner of Social Services failed to act within sixty days of a license
application for one of these facilities, the applicant could begin
operating and continue to operate until the Commissioner made a
decision on that application. Someone apparently apprehended the
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
82. See id. § 2.1-346(E) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
83. See id.
84. 247Va. 309,440 S.E.2d 908 (f994). The dissenters inLittle thought that the standard
of proof for a FOIA violation ought to be that of clear and convincing evidence, at least where
the defendant is accused of willfully and knowingly violating the act. See id. at 323, 440
S.E.2d at 917 (Carrico, C.J., and Hassel, J., dissenting).
85. See VA. CODEANN. § 2.1-346(E) (Cum. Supp. 1999). The General Assembly also raised
the potential price of willful and knowing violation. Members of public bodies who act - or
refuse to act- in such a fashion now face a minimum first-offense penalty of $100, a four-fold
increase, for which they are personally liable. A second offense now carries a minimum
personal penalty of $500, double what it was before the revision. See id. § 2.1-346.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1999).
86. See id. § 63.1-196 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
87. See id. § 63.1-200 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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risk this section presented for children. Thus, the section has now
been amended so that the Commissioner may take more than sixty
days to determine whether the applicant meets the statutory
criteria, such as good character, financial responsibility, and a record
free of conviction for felony child abuse or neglect.88
Important to the safety and well-being of Virginia's children, this
amendment is worth noting in a wider context as a harbinger,
perhaps, of the long overdue return of reason to legislating about the
length of time administrative judgments should take.
In 1993, the General Assembly amended article 3 of the APA,
imposing deadlines of ninety days for decisions from formal
adjudicative proceedings." The consequence of failure by a board or
commission to issue a final decision within ninety days from the date
of the hearing was that the decision was deemed to be in favor of the
named party."0 Thus, if a board or commission, for good reason or
bad, took more than ninety days after a formal hearing to decide
about a license or permit application, renewal, suspension or
revocation, the APA directed judgment in favor of the license holder
or applicant. Procrastination by those having the duty to decide
administrative cases is certainly to be rued. But it ought to have
been obvious that the same critical public interests that warranted
regulating certain activities or actors through licenses or permits
would be jeopardized by a legislative fiat that, qualified or not,
convenient or not, economical or not, safe or not, the named party
always wins in overtime. The 1993 amendment to Virginia Code
section 9-6.14:12 mistakenly places at risk the public-the beneficia-
ries of licensing-in an attempt to sanction the nonfeasance of board
members or commissioners-the public's trustees. Such a blunt
statutory instrument is unnecessary. A traditional remedy properly
affords sanctions against the decider or deciders for unnecessary
delay in deciding, but only after balancing the interest of the
88. "The provisions of this section shall not apply to a child-caring institution, child-
placing agency, or independent foster home." Id. (Curn. Supp. 1999). Applicants for licenses
to operate other facilities governed by chapter 10 can still operate without a license if the
Commissioner takes too long. Whatever the undesirable prospect that moved the 1999
amendment pertaining to child-caring institutions, child-placing agencies, or independent
foster homes, it must not have extended to other child-welfare agencies, for example, child
day centers or programs and family day homes.
89. See id. § 9-6.14:12 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
90. See id. § 9-6.14:12(G) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
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complaining party in a prompt resolution with that of the public in
a careful resolution. That remedy is a writ of mandamus."1
B. More Penalties for Delay of Game in Licensing
In 1995, the General Assembly enacted a requirement that the
Alcoholic Beverage Control ("ABC") Board identify violations for
which a waiver of a hearing and payment of a civil charge, in lieu of
suspension, might be accepted and incorporate them into regula-
tions.9 2 The ABC Board was given three years to promulgate these
regulations.9" None were issued. This term, the General Assembly
responded by commanding the ABC Board to issue emergency
regulations effective as of July 1, 1999, and to follow them with final
regulations within a year.94 The act declares that, for want of these
regulations, the General Assembly considers a public emergency to
exist9 5 presumably sufficient for dispensing with the provisions for
public notice and comment generally required by the APA. This is a
finding which the ABC Board is competent to make, but has not.96 It
is, of course, the prerogative of the people's representatives to declare
an emergency so that the participatory guarantees they had earlier
established by law may be circumvented. It is also within their power
to amend the ABC Board's organic law so that it specifies when a
licensee can "cop a plea" and pay a fine. Instead of amending the
organic ABC law, the General Assembly has issued the legislative
equivalent of mandamus. The consequence is that the rule becomes
law without the ventilation of either legislative process or notice-and-
comment rulemaking, at least for a year. What will happen if the
Board fails to promulgate a permanent replacement by June 30,2000
remains to be seen.
91. See Prince William County v. Hylton Enters., Inc., 216 Va. 582,584,221 S.E.2d 534,
536 (1976) (stating that mandamus is proper when there is a legal duty to perform a
ministerial duty); Mountain Venture Partnership Lovettsville II v. Town of Lovettsville
Planning Comm'n, 26Va. Cir. 50,53 (Loudoun County 1991) (stating that mandamus is"used
to compel a public official to perform a purely ministerial duty imposed on him by law");
Stafford County Bd. of Supervisors v. Shanholtz, 9 Va. Cir. 394, 397 (Richmond City 1976)
(granting writ of mandamus compelling performance of ministerial duties).
92. See VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-227(E) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
93. See id.
94. See Act of Mar. 24, 1999, ch. 380, 1999 Va. Acts 439.
95. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(C)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
96. See Act of Mar. 24, 1999, ch. 380, 1999 Va. Acts 439.
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III. COURT DECISIONS
A. Discretionary Decision Limits Rulemaking
Woods v. Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles97 involved a
revocation by the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") of a license
to sell automobiles.9 In 1995, after several years away from selling
cars, Woods mistakenly believed that his license was expired and he
applied for its renewal. 99 In his application, Woods disclosed that he
had been convicted in 1994 of a felony unrelated to car sales. °0
Relying on Virginia Code section 46.2-1575(13),"1 the DMV conveyed
its intention to revoke his license, and Woods requested a hearing.0 2
The hearing officer recommended revocation, on the basis of a DMV
policy of refusing to grant a license to any applicant who was
convicted of a felony within five years of application for DMV
permit.'0 3 This policy was initiated by an internal memorandum in
1994.104 Previous practice had been to refuse licenses only to those
applicants who were convicted of felonies related to the selling of
motor vehicles. 1' The Commissioner adopted the recommendation
and Woods appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the Commis-
sioner's decision.10
6
Before the court of appeals, Woods argued that the policy on
which the revocation of his license was based was really a rule, and
therefore invalid because it had not been promulgated in accordance
with the rulemaking procedures of the APA. °7 The court first
confirmed that "[ain agency's rule or regulation is invalid if the
agency failed to comply with . . .[the APA] in the promulgation
process," but then held that DMV's policy did not have to comply
with the procedural requirements of the APA because it amounted
97. 26 Va. App. 450, 495 S.E.2d 505 (Ct. App. 1998).
98. See id. at 452, 495 S.E.2d at 506.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. "A license or certificate of dealer registration or qualification issued under this
subtitle may be denied, suspended, or revoked on any one or more of the following grounds:
... [h]aving been convicted of a felony." VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1575(13) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
102. See Woods, 26 Va. App. at 453, 495 S.E.2d at 507.
103. See id. at 454, 495 S.E.2d at 507.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 454-55, 495 S.E.2d at 507.
107. See id. at 452, 495 S.E.2d at 506.
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only to an interpretive rule.' For the latter proposition, the court
relied on Jackson v. W., 09 where the court affirmed a determination
by the Department of Social Services ("DSS") pursuant to guidelines
that had not been promulgated in accordance with APA rulemaking
procedure."0 According to the court in Jackson, a guideline that
"do[es] not purport to be a substitute for the [organic] statute... [is]
designed merely to provide assistance to local departments in the
administration of ... [the agency's mission and does] not have the
force of law," is not a rule or regulation."' Because in Woods the
court of appeals found DMV's internal memorandum to be merely a
policy guideline without force of law, it too could form the basis for
an adverse determination without promulgation in accordance with
the APA."
2
Interestingly, what the Woods court gave away in deference to the
agency's authority to make unpublished interpretive rules, the court
then took back through statutory interpretation. The court found the
DMV's interpretation of section 46.2-1575 to be inconsistent with the
policy underpinning the statute, and therefore invalid as a basis for
revocation.1 3 The statute provides that [a] license.., issued under
this subtitle may be denied, suspended or revoked" by DMV on the
basis of eighteen listed grounds."4 According to the court, this
affords DMV discretionary authority, but DMV's policy foreclosed the
use of discretion, because it made revocation mandatory in all cases
of the sort it addressed." 5 In other words, the statute reflects the
General Assembly's recognition that "in some cases, license revoca-
tion may not be an appropriate remedy."" 6 However, DMV's policy
"foreclosed any opportunity for a licensee . . . to appeal to the
108. Id. at 456, 495 S.E.2d at 508 (citing Virginia Bd. of Medicine v. Virginia Physical
Therapy Ass'n, 13 Va. App. 458,413 S.E.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 245 Va. 125,427 S.E.2d
183 (1993)).
109. 14Va. App. 391,399-400,419 S.E.2d 385,389-90 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that in order
to assist agency employees in carrying out the purpose of the basic law, an agency may
establish guidelines without the binding force of law).
110. See id.
111. Id. at 399, 419 S.E.2d at 389-90. As a basis for concluding that the policy guideline
was indeed an interpretive rule and not a de facto rule, the Woods court noted that the policy
consisted of a written statement "that informed Department employees charged with
reviewing licensees' applications of the guidelines that were to be employed from that date
forward." Woods, 26 Va. App. at 458, 495 S.E.2d. at 509. Such a statement, according to the
court, met the definition of an interpretive rule given in Jackson. See id.
112. See Woods, 26 Va. App. at 458-59, 495 S.E.2d at 509.
113. See id. at 459,495 S.E.2d at 509.
114. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-1575(1) to -1575(18) (Cum. Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
115. See Woods, 26 Va. App. at 458, 495 S.E.2d at 509.
116. Id.
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discretionary authority of the Commissioner. " 117 The court remanded
the case for reconsideration by reference to a standard in which
discretion might operate." 8
Woods teaches that, at least in some cases, an agency may not
summarily deny all applications on the basis of satisfying one of a
list of statutory factors unless the authorizing statute uses manda-
tory or directory language, such as "shall revoke."" 9 According to the
court, discretionary language, such as "may revoke," requires the
agency to use discretion on a case-by-case basis, and forbids the
agency from binding an entire class of applicants even if, according
to the agency's expertise and experience, the statutory factor
distinguishing such a class warrants mandatory disqualification in
all cases. 2 °
117. Id.
118. See id. at 459, 495 S.E.2d at 510.
119. See id. at 458, 495 S.E.2d at 509. Even "shall" in a statute addressed to a public
official need not be taken as mandatory, unless a contrary intent is manifested by the General
Assembly. See infra note 257.
120. Courts have reacted differently to cases where agencies forego delegated discretion.
See Fook Hong Mak v. INS, 435 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1970). In Fook Hung Mak, the court
reviewed the Attorney General's refusal to adjust the status of an alien facing deportation.
See id. at 730. In the case of an alien who entered lawfully but overstayed in the United
States, section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1) (1994),
authorized the Attorney General "in his discretion and under such regulation as might
prescribe," to change a petitioning alien's immigration status so that deportation was
unnecessary. Id. at 729. Subsequently, the Attorney General identified a subclass of aliens
who entered the United States lawfully on transit visas but failed to resume their journeys,
and prohibited members of that subclass from seeking such adjustment by petition pursuant
to 28 F.R. 3078 (1963). See id. Fook unsuccessfully challenged the lawfulness of the
regulation. For the court, Judge Friendly wrote:
We are unable to understand why there should be any general principle
forbidding an administrator, vested with discretionary power, to determine by
appropriate rulemaking that he will not use it in favor of a particular class on a
case-by-case basis, if his determination is founded on considerations rationally
related to the statute he is administering. The legislature's grant of discretion to
accord a privilege does not imply a mandate that this must inevitably be done by
examining each case rather than by identifying groups.
Id. at 730; see also Hanauer v. Reich, 82 F.3d 1304 (4th Cir. 1996); Vasquez v. Horn, 438 A.2d
570 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981). But see Asimakapoulos v. INS, 445 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1971)
(stating that the Board may not rely on a test that prevents the exercise of discretion when
an applicant for relief qualifies for the exercise of discretion). A stronger case for the
legitimacy of an agency rule precluding its exercise of discretion in all similar cases can be
made where, as in 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1), the legislature conjoined delegation of rulemaking
power with that of discretionary adjudicative power. The combination of fimdamentally
exclusive ways of proceeding implies that the legislature intended to afford the agency
alternatives under the circumstances. No such conjunction appears in VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-
1575 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
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B. Right to Confrontation in Administrative Cases
In Carter v. Gordon,'2 the DSS appealed a decision of the Fairfax
County Circuit Court that reversed a DSS finding of "founded"
regarding allegations of sexual abuse committed by Gordon, a former
elementary school teacher. 122 At issue was the extent to which a
hearing afforded by the DSS must comply with procedures guaran-
teed by the Due Process Clause.'
Gordon was suspended from work after a student accused him of
rape.'" Twenty-three students subsequently accused him of "im-
proper touching." 25 The Child Protective Services Division ("CPS")
of the Fairfax Department of Human Development investigated and
found five allegations of sexual abuse to be "founded." 126 CPS notified
Gordon of its findings, as well as the school's superintendent, who
continued Gordon's suspension. 27 Gordon requested an informal
conference with the CPS Director. 2 The findings of the CPS were
affimed, and Gordon appealed to the DSS for a hearing. 29 At the
DSS hearing, Gordon was permitted to introduce evidence, cross-
examine the investigators, and challenge the reliability of statements
made by the five children to CPS investigators. 30 The children
themselves were not present at the hearing and were not available
for cross-examination.' 3' Two of them, however, had been cross-
examined previously by Gordon's attorney at an earlier hearing
before the School Board.'32 The DSS hearing officer found "by clear
121. 28 Va. App. 133, 502 S.E.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1998).
122. See id. When a sexual abuse complaint is filed with the DSS, the first step is an initial
determination of whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support the allegation.
See Turner v. Jackson, 14 Va. App. 423, 428 n.4, 417 S.E.2d 881, 885 n.4 (Ct. App. 1992)
(citing 7 Protective Services Manual § I, ch. A, at 56-60). If this standard is met, a
determination of "founded" will issue and the agency may pursue further action, subject to
two layers of administrative appeals. See id. Further action may include listing on the Central
Registry of sex offenders and reporting findings to appropriate authorities. See Gordon, 28
Va. App. at 145-46, 502 S.E.2d at 703.
123. See Gordon, 28 Va. App. at 137, 502 S.E.2d at 699.
124. See id.




129. See id. at 138-39, 502 S.E.2d at 699.
130. See id. at 139, 502 S.E.2d at 699.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 139 n.2, 502 S.E.2d at 699 n.2.
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and convincing evidence... [that the students] were sexually abused
by [Gordon]." 3 '
Gordon appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the
determination of the DSS, finding that "DSS's bias, refusal to allow
Gordon to cross-examine the complainants and notification of the
school board violated Gordon's due process rights and .. . this
violation could not be cured by remand."'34 On appeal by DSS, the
court of appeals reversed, finding that procedures employed by the
welfare agencies did not violate the Due Process Clause in either the
U.S. or Virginia constitutions.'35 Relying on Jackson v. W. ,136 the
court found that the agencies afforded Gordon all procedural rights
required by the Due Process Clause for an adjudication that results
in the entry of the name of the subject on a "founded" complaint in
a Central Registry.'37 The court refused to accept Gordon's argument
133. Id. at 139, 502 S.E.2d at 700.
134. Id. Reviewing the record from the DSS hearing, the circuit court also found that the
record did not contain substantial evidence proving serious harm to the children as required
to support the DSS's Level 1 finding. The court of appeals, however, found that the circuit
court had failed to give proper deference to the DSS determination of"founded" and concluded
to the contrary that Gordon's actions did indeed meet Level 1 requirement for three of the
complaints. See id. at 143, 502 S.E.2d at 701-02.
135. See id. at 148, 502 S.E.2d at 704.
136. 14 Va. App. 391, 419 S.E.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1992).
137. See Gordon, 28 Va. App. at 145,502 S.E.2d at 703. The court in Jackson relied upon
Hannah v. Larche, 364 U.S. 855 (1960), where voting registrars challenged the procedures
of the United States Civil Rights Commission. The registrars appeared at a hearing where
the Commission investigated claims that voting rights were being violated due to racist
motives. See Hannah, 363 U.S. at 421. Among other objections by the registrars to the
Commission's procedures in that hearing was the central objection that they were denied the
right to confront and cross-examine those who complained. See id. at 427-28. Because the
Commission existed only to find facts and not to adjudicate or sanction, the Supreme Court
held that the Due Process Clause did not apply. See id. at 441. As Chief Justice Warren put
it for the Court,
[The Commission's] function is purely investigative and fact-finding. It does not
adjudicate. It does not hold trials or determine anyone's civil or criminal liability.
It does not issue orders. Nor does it indict, punish, or impose any legal sanctions.
It does not make determinations depriving anyone of his life, liberty, or property.
In short, the Commission does not and cannot take any affirmative action which
will affect an individual's legal rights. The only purpose of its existence is to find
facts which may subsequently be used as the basis for legislative or executive
action.
Id. The fact that the findings of the Commission might damage the reputations of the
registrars, put their continued employment in jeopardy, or even lead to criminal prosecution
was dismissed as "purely conjectural" and "collateral," and therefore deemed without due
process impact. Id. at 443. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result, observing that
Were the Commission exercising an accusatory function, were its duty to find that
named individuals were responsible for wrongful deprivation of voting rights and
to advertise such finding or to serve as part of the process of criminal prosecution,
the rigorous protections relevant to criminal prosecutions might well be the
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that because the process employed by the DSS also led to his removal
from teaching, it was insufficient. 138 Instead, mimicking the approach
taken by the United States Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis,'39 the
court treated the decision of the DSS separately from that of
Gordon's employer so that the loss of his job was dissociated from the
process afforded by the welfare agencies.140 Employment is a
personal interest sufficiently important so that a threat of its
deprivation implicates the guarantees of the Due Process Clause.'
4
'
Even if the threat of such a loss triggered a constitutional right of the
accused to cross-examine his accusers, Gordon had his chance at the
School Board hearing. As Paul v. Davis illustrates, damage to
reputation, on the other hand, is not regarded as so grievous an
injury, Alone, it will not ordinarily oblige an agency to afford the
full panoply of procedures that are required by due process in other
circumstances.
controlling starting point for assessing the protection which the Commission's
procedure provides.
Id. at488 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969), a union
member challenged the procedures of the Louisiana Labor-Management Commission of
Inquiry, charged by statute with investigating and finding facts concerning criminal
violations of state or federal labor laws. See id. at 414. Among the plaintiffs challenges to the
Commission's procedures was his objection that a party was denied the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses called in opposition. See id. at 419. No majority opinion accompanied
the judgment that this indeed stated a claim of constitutional injury. Nevertheless, in the
plurality opinion, three justices joined in reaffirming Hannah, while finding that the
Commission in this case was subject to the Due Process Clause because its functions were
accusatory, and its judgments were sufficiently "akin to making an official adjudication of
criminal culpability." Id. at 427. Justice Douglas, who concurred only in the holding of
Hannah, again distanced himself from the reasoning of the majority in that case, while
agreeing that the Due Process Clause applied to this Commission. See Jenkins, 395 U.S. at
432 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Black, who dissented in Hannah, concurred with the
plurality opinion in this case. See id. at 432 (Black, J., concurring). In other words, a majority
of the Court agreed in Jenkins that when the Commission's hearing could produce a finding
of probable cause that a party committed a crime, due process required the Commission to
recognize the party's right of cross examination. If there is, as three members of the Supreme
Court once insisted, a line separating the procedures examined in Hannah from those
examined in Jenkins, see id. at 425 (plurality opinion), it seems to be one separating
generalized fact-finding in aid of legislation from that which produces a particularized fact-
finding that a party has committed criminal conduct. The court of appeals found in Jackson,
and again in Gordon, that a DSS adjudication that results in the entry of the name of the
subject ofa "founded" sexual abuse complaint in the Central Registry is more like the former
than the latter, even though the DSS is obliged to report its findings to criminal law
enforcement authorities. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.6 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
138. See Gordon, 28 Va. App. at 146, 502 S.E.2d at 703.
139. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
140. See Gordon, 28 Va. App. at 146-47, 502 S.E.2d at 703.
141. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997); Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532 (1985) (discussing employment's due process implications).
142. See Davis, 424 U.S. at 711-12.
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Laying aside the nature of the allegations against Gordon and the
weight of the evidence against him, this case ought to raise a
question about the blind eye of a court willing to conclude that the
DSS determination that student complaints of child abuse by public
school teachers are "founded" does not trigger due process scrutiny
because it does not directly result in the loss of employment. But it
would be wrong to regard the court as stubbornly unmindful of the
real-life consequences for an accused teacher. Gordon's employer
conducted its own fact-finding, and allowed Gordon's attorney to
cross-examine two of his juvenile accusers. 43 So long as the School
Board reached its judgment by a path not dependent upon DSS
findings, DSS procedure ought to be viewed as irrelevant to Gordon's
loss of employment. Only in the event that the process and findings
of the DSS were somehow treated by the School Board as precluding
its de novo consideration of the same charges would it be necessary
to test the procedures of the DSS against due process. 1
C. The Elusive Executive Privilege
In Griffin v. Virginia Department of Transportation,'145 a claim of
executive privilege was denied on the ground that the privilege is not
part of the law of Virginia.'46 Griffin and other highway inspectors
brought an action under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act 47
against their employer to recover overtime due but unpaid for the
period from December 1994 to December 1996.48 The Department
began to pay overtime for the same sort of work in January 1997
and, while deposing the Secretary of Transportation and the Depart-
ment's Chief Engineer, the plaintiffs asked about conversations
leading to that decision. 49 The Secretary and the Chief Engineer
declined to answer those questions, asserting their executive
143. See Gordon, 28 Va. App. at 139 n.2, 502 S.E.2d at 699 n.2.
144. Cf Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 534 (1988) (holding that the Merit
Systems Protection Board did not have jurisdiction to review the denial of a security
clearance, lack of which was cause for employment termination); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913
F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that there is no liberty interest in employment
requiring security clearance).
145. 46 Va. Cir. 399 (Richmond City 1998).
146. See id. at 400.
147. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. III 1999).
148. See Griffin, 46 Va. Cir. at 400.
149. See id. at 399.
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privilege.' ° Afterward, the plaintiffs moved to compel and the court,
rejecting the officers' claim of privilege, granted the motion.''
For the proposition that executive privilege is part of the law of
Virginia, the defendants relied on Taylor v. WorrellEnterprises.5 ' In
Taylor, the Supreme Court of Virginia found telephone logs belong-
ing to the Governor of Virginia exempt from disclosure under
FOIA."' In a footnote, the supreme court observed:
Executive privilege reflects the need of the executive to withhold information
requested pursuant to a legitimate exercise of governmental authority. A
violation of the separation of powers doctrine - the improper invasion by one
branch of government into the province of another - is not a prerequisite for
the assertion of the executive privilege doctrine." 4
Judge Hughes made this quotation part of his opinion in Griffin,
and he conceded that if there were an executive privilege, it could be
asserted by officials of low rank as well as high.'55 Nevertheless, he
held that the doctrine of separation of powers was not implicated by
the subject matter of the plaintiffs questions, and that the claims of
executive privilege in this case were without foundation in Virginia
law. 56
If the supreme court really meant what it said, albeit only in dicta
in Taylor, then executive privilege should apply even when the
questions put to executive officers do not, in a court's mind, trigger
separation of powers concerns. Indeed, it is hard to see how separa-
tion of powers is not called into question when a court exerts its
constitutional power to compel a cabinet-level executive officer to
reveal the background for a decision in which that officer's discretion
plays a substantial role. If that is so, then it is article III, section 1...
150. See id.
151. See id. at 402.
152. 242 Va. 219, 409 S.E.2d 136 (1991).
153. See id. at 224,409 S.E.2d at 139-40 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-340 to -346.1 (Repl.
Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1999)).
154. Id. at 222 n.3, 409 S.E.2d at 138 n.3 (citation omitted).
155. See Griffin, 46 Va. Cir. at 401.
156. See id. at 400-02.
157. VA. CONST. art. III, § 1. That section provides:
Section 1. Departments to be distinct. The legislative, executive, and judicial
departments shall be separate and distinct, so that none exercise the powers
properly belonging to the others, nor any person exercise the power of more than
one of them at the same time; provided, however, administrative agencies may
be created by the General Assembly with such authority and duties as the
General Assembly may prescribe. Provisions may be made for judicial review of
any finding, order, or judgment of such administrative agencies.
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and article V, section 1158 of the Constitution of Virginia that are the
sources of the privilege in Virginia law. Moreover, Terry v. Wilder"9
appears to confound any assertion that no authority for the privilege
exists. In Terry, the Richmond City Circuit Court granted the
Governor's motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum, on the ground
that the documents relating to the Governor's decision to replace the
Attorney General as counsel for the Virginia Retirement System
were protected by the Governor's executive privilege. 16 For these
reasons, it would be imprudent to conclude that there really is no
such privilege enjoyed by the officers of Virginia's executive branch.
D. A Statutory Informer's Privilege
In Bell v. General Masonry, Inc.,'6' the Fairfax County Circuit
Court recognized an informer's privilege for those who provide
information in the course of an agency's investigation to ensure
compliance with regulations. 62 The court, however, balanced the
privilege against the defendant's need to prepare an adequate
defense, and settled upon production to the court for in camera
inspection. 16
3
After inspecting the defendant General Masonry's workplace, the
Commissioner of Labor and Industry issued a citation for a violation
of Virginia Occupational Safety and Health Standards of the
Construction Industry. 64 General Masonry notified the Commission
of its intent to contest the citation, and the Commissioner filed a bill
of complaint asking the circuit court to affirm the citation.16 General
Masonry then sought discovery of the identities of the persons
interviewed during the workplace inspection and of any statements
given by its employees. 166 The Commissioner objected and General
Masonry moved the court to compel production. 167
The Supreme Court of Virginia has not yet ruled on whether the
common-law informer's privilege applies in civil cases, but in an
158. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1 ("The chief executive power of the Commonwealth shall be
vested in a Governor.").
159. 29 Va. Cir. 418 (Richmond City 1992), rev'd on other grounds sub noma. Wilder v.
Attorney Gen., 247 Va. 119, 439 S.E.2d 398 (1994).
160. See id. at 423.
161. 46 Va. Cir. 83 (Fairfax County 1998).
162. See id. at 85.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 83.





earlier action between private parties, Johnson v. Virginia Electric
and Power Co.,16 the Commissioner opposed the defendants'
subpoenas to produce the written statements of employees obtained
in the course of a similar investigation by relying in part on an
informer's privilege. 6 9 The Commissioner also argued that disclosure
of the sort specified by the subpoenas was forbidden by provisions of
title 40.1 of the Virginia Code, which prohibits disclosure of informa-
tion obtained in the course of an investigation for any other purpose
and directs the Commissioner to question employees "privately." '
Defendants took the position that the privilege was intended to
protect the identity of an informer rather than the content of the
informer's statements, and the small size of the relevant workforce
in their case left no doubt as to the informers' identities.'' The court
ordered the Commissioner to produce the statements under seal, to
be opened only in the event that their authors were called as
witnesses in the trial or as warranted by other circumstances.'72 In
his opinion, Judge Swett did not explicate on which of the Commis-
sioner's grounds his decision rested or if the informer's privilege was
as narrow as urged by the defendants.
In General Masonry, the circuit court also turned to title 40.1 for
evidence that the General Assembly intended to afford to informers,
in the context of OSHA investigations, the sort of protection afforded
at common law to informers in criminal prosecutions.'73 In addition
to the direction that employees be questioned privately, the court
relied on a provision requiring confidentiality for those who advised
the Commissioner of hazardous conditions.' 4 These provisions and
the policy underlying the privilege persuaded Judge Alden that the
statute confers an informer's privilege on workplace safety informers
in the Commonwealth.'
5
Turning to the scope of the informer's privilege, the court found it
to be a bar to unconditional production of the identity or statement
of an informer by the Commissioner, but acknowledged a conflicting
right of the defendants to adequately prepare a defense.'7 6 Like
168. 31 Va. Cir. 326 (Charlottesville City 1993).
169. See id. at 327.
170. See id. at 326 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-11, -49.8(2) (Repl. Vol. 1994)).
171. See id. at 326-27.
172. See id. at 327.
173. See Bell v. General Masonry, Inc., 46 Va. Cir. 83, 84-85 (Fairfax County 1998).
174. See id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.2 (Rep. Vol. 1994)).
175. See id. at 85.
176. See id.
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Judge Swett before him, Judge Alden directed the Commissioner c0
produce the employee interview statements to the court for in
camera assessment of their relevance and materiality. 7 7 The court
would then balance the public interest in protecting the anonymity
of informers with the needs of the defendants and take additional
action as warranted. 178
It would be a mistake to regard General Masonry as authority for
the broad proposition that an informer's privilege derived from
common law must be recognized in settings beyond that of a criminal
prosecution, that is, in administrative cases generally. The court did
not apply old common law in a new context, but instead inferred the
existence of an analogous privilege created by statute. Accordingly,
it would be a mistake to assert such a privilege in administrative
cases in other regulatory settings without being prepared to offer
evidence from the appropriate organic law similar to that offered by
the Commissioner in Virginia Electric and General Masonry.171
E. Deference for a Hearing Officer's Credibility-Based Findings
In Liberty Nursing Home, Inc. v. Department of Medical Assis-
tance Services,80 the nursing home operator appealed the decision of
the Department of Medical Assistance Services ("DMAS") that the
operator was overpaid by Medicaid during the period extending from
late 1979 to mid-1990.' 8' The nursing home operator contested both
the formula applied by DMAS in determining that the payment had
been excessive, and the timeliness of recalculation in light of Virginia
Code section 32.1-325-1:1.'82 According to the operator, that section
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Because the court in Bell adhered to statutes when it fashioned the privilege, its
solution neatly avoids separation of powers jeopardy. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523 (1978) (holding that
absent constitutional or statutory mandate, reviewing court could not demand Commission
to permit cross-examination of its experts who presented opinions in a public hearing for
rulemaking). See generally 1 KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,ADMINIsTRATIvE
LAW TREATISE § 7.8 (3d ed. 1994); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS § 6.4.9a (2d ed. 1992); SCHWARTZ, supra note 80, at § 4.13.
180. 45 Va. Cir. 534 (Roanoke City 1998), appeal filed sub nom. Smith v. Liberty Nursing
Home, Inc., No. 2926-98-3 (Va. Ct. App.).
181. See id. at 534.
182. See id. The pertinent part of that statute reads:
B. The Director of Medical Assistance Services shall collect by any means
available to him at law any amount owed to the Commonwealth because of
overpayment for medical assistance services. Upon making an initial
determination that an overpayment has been made to the provider pursuant
to [section] 32.1-325.1, the Director shall notify the provider of the amount of
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is a statute of limitation on the power of DMAS to recoup
overpayments after four years.18 After an informal fact-finding
conference, the nursing home operator requested an adjudicative
hearing pursuant to the APA. 84 The hearing officer made findings of
fact and law favorable to the operator, but they were rejected by the
director, notwithstanding that the hearing officer based several of his
findings on the demeanor of witnesses appearing before him. 85 The
director rejected the hearing officer's report on the ground that the
hearing officer "fundamentally misconstrued and misunderstood the
procedural stature of an administrative appeal," apparently by
declining to give absolute deference to DMAS's interpretation of its
own rules, even in the face of contrary evidence.' 86 At the same time,
the director concluded that section 32.1-325.1:1 did not bar DMAS
from recouping overpayments to service providers after four years
elapsed. 1
87
The operator appealed the director's decision to the City of
Roanoke Circuit Court, which reversed and remanded the case for
new fact-finding and decision. 18 According to Judge Doherty, the
normal deference owed by a reviewing court to an agency's findings
of fact was unwarranted in this instance because the director, when
making his findings, failed to comply with statutory authority.8 9 For
example, the director failed to give findings of fact made by the
hearing officer that were explicitly based on the demeanor of
witnesses the deference required by the APA."'9 It seemed clear to
Judge Doherty that this deference owed by the court to an agency for
its fact-finding must be less than absolute if the provision for judicial
review of fact-finding in the APA is to be something more than a
meaningless act on the part of the legislature.'9 ' He found some
the overpayment. Such initial determination shall be made within the earlier
of(i) four years, or (ii) fifteen months after filing of the final cost report by
the provider subsequent to sale of the facility or termination of the
provider ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-325.1:1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
183. See Liberty Nursing Home, 45 Va. Cir. at 536.
184. See id. at 534.
185. See id. at 535.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 536.
188. See id. at 538.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 535. For the proposition that judicial deference normally due agency fact-
finding is excused when the agency fails to comply with statutory authority, Judge Doherty
relied on Johnston-Willis, Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231,369 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1988). See id.
191. See Liberty Nursing Home, 45 Va. Cir. at 535.
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deference expressed in the presumption of official correctness that
the APA obliges courts to afford agency fact-finding, 192 but Judge
Doherty concluded that the deference is not so great that a reviewing
court must accept an agency's overruling of a hearing officer's fact-
finding without "specific and adequate reasons for determining the
credibility of witnesses differently from the hearing officer.
" 19 3
Judge Doherty cited Jamison v. Jamison'94 for the proposition
that a hearing officer's findings "must be given deference and should
be sustained, unless plainly wrong and not supported by the evi-
dence."' Jamison, however, involved a circuit court's rejection of
findings in the report of a commissioner in chancery. 196 Care should
be taken to keep this proposition by Judge Doherty in its proper
context, especially when it is offered for review of a decision made by
an administrative agency. As applied to a hearing officer's findings
of fact based substantially on the demeanor of witnesses, as in
Liberty Nursing Home, it is correct as well as succinct. As applied to
a hearing officer's findings of fact more generally, however, the
proposition would be too broad. It fails to account for the varying
levels of expertise of the hearing officer and the agency, as well as
the restraints on the discretion of courts imposed by the General
Assembly in the APA'9 7 and the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers. Deferring to a hearing officer's findings of fact based on
assessments of the demeanor of witnesses takes proper account of
the fact that the hearing officer was present when they testified,
while the agency was not. Any subsequent determination by the
agency independent of that of the hearing officer must be a product
of the comparatively sterile evidence of the transcript, from which
demeanor and emphasis are largely absent. On the other hand, other
sorts of factual findings by a hearing officer, including other findings
based on a witness's credibility, do not deserve the same deference.
When credibility turns not on demeanor but instead on the inherent
plausibility of the testimony itself, for example, an agency more
familiar with the customs of a trade or profession or the widely
practiced conventions of an industry or commerce may justifiably
reject the initial finding of a less sophisticated hearing officer.' 8 An
192. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
193. Liberty Nursing Home, 45 Va. Cir. at 535.
194. 3 Va. App. 644, 352 S.E.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1987).
195. Liberty Nursing Home, 45 Va. Cir. at 536 (citing Jamison v. Jamison, 3 Va. App. 644,
352 S.E.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1987)).
196. See Jamison, 3 Va. App. at 645-46, 352 S.E.2d at 720-21.
197. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
198. See, e.g., NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co. 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954).
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agency that rejects findings made by a hearing officer other than
those explicitly identified in the hearing officer's report as the
product of demeanor assessment does not act contrary to the purpose
behind section 9-6.14:12. If the agency's contrary finding is supported
by substantial evidence, it must be sustained if a reviewing court is
to remain faithful to the terms of the jurisdiction it enjoys under the
APA. Indeed, section 9-6.14:17 requires a reviewing court to take due
account of the experience and expertise of an agency, in addition to
obliging the court to afford an agency's factual decisions a presump-
tion of regularity.
All findings of fact by a hearing officer, therefore, are not equal;
even among those based on an assessment of the credibility of a
witness, some are more vulnerable to agency rejection based on that
agency's specialized experience and expertise. Those with the
greatest claim to deference are explicitly based on the hearing
officer's assessment of credibility when derived from the demeanor
of the witness. Herein lie lessons for careful hearing officers and
circumspect agency case deciders. The former should take care in
their reports to specifically identify such findings that are based on
demeanor, while the latter should take care to make explicit what of
their specialized experience and expertise warrants rejecting a
credibility judgment by the hearing officer.
F. Distinguishing Statutes of Limitation and Repose in Public
Law
The Director of DMAS is authorized to collect overpayments "by
any means available to him at law."199 According to the statute, the
overpayment determination "shall be made within the earlier of (i)
four years, or (ii) fifteen months after filing of the final cost report by
the provider subsequent to sale of the facility or termination of the
provider.""' In Liberty NursingHomes, the operator argued that the
four-year time limit bound DMAS and barred recoupment of
payments made more than four years earlier." 1 DMAS disagreed, in
part because of the general rule that a statute of limitations does not
bind the Commonwealth unless it explicitly says it does.20 2 Judge
Doherty approached this issue from a starting point similar to that
from which he began his analysis of the deference issue discussed
199. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-325.1:1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
200. Id.
201. 45 Va. Cir. 534, 536 (Roanoke City 1998).
202. See id.
19991
758 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
above, that is, by assuming that the language of a statute was
intended by its drafters to have some effect.2"3 Assuming the statute
was intended to apply to someone, Judge Doherty found that the
four-year time period must apply to DMAS because DMAS was the
only entity addressed. The court went on to conclude that the time
period could not be a statute of limitations, that is, a temporal
restriction on the claim to a remedy or assertion of a right."5 If it
were, then application of the general rule urged by DMAS would
make the statute meaningless. Instead the court held that the time
period in section 32.1-325.1:1(B) amounted to a statute of repose,
reflecting the policy of the legislature that there should be time after
which the defendant should no longer be at risk of liability.0 6 For all
this, the court regarded itself as governed by Commonwealth v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation."7
Students of federal administrative law should take note of the
total absence from this part of Judge Doherty's opinion of any
consideration of what deference, if any, ought to be paid to the
DMAS's interpretation of section 32.1-325.1:1(B). The controversial
position on this issue taken by the United States Supreme Court in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.2"'
has yet to secure a foothold in the administrative law of Virginia.
That the courts of Virginia are not yet ready to yield to administra-
tive agencies their traditional authority to determine what statutes
mean seems clear enough. As the Virginia Supreme Court firmly
stated
The judicial power of this Commonwealth is vested in the Supreme Court and
in such other courts as are established by the General Assembly. It is the sole
province of the judiciary to expound the laws and to adjudicate cases. That
power, which emanates from the Virginia Constitution, is not shared with
any other branch of government.2 °
G. When Hearsay Alone Suffices
The weight to be given hearsay evidence in an administrative
record preoccupied the Loudoun County Circuit Court in Powell v.
203. See id. at 536-37.
204. See id. at 537-38.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 538.
207. See id. at 537 (citing Commonwealth v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 238 Va. 595,
385 S.E.2d 865 (1989)).
208. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
209. Holland v. Johnson, 241 Va. 553,555,403 S.E.2d 356,357-58 (1991) (citation omitted).
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United States Postal Service.21 The court upheld a decision by the
Virginia Employment Commission ("VEC") against a claim that the
court was empowered by statute to set aside a decision based
exclusively on hearsay evidence.211 Section 60.2-625 provides in
pertinent part that "the findings of the Commission as to the facts,
if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be
conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to
questions of law."2 1 2 Powell was discharged from the Postal Service
on grounds of misconduct.13 In the course of denying her claim to
unemployment benefits, the VEC afforded Powell two hearings, one
before an Appeals Examiner and the other before a Special Exam-
iner.21 4 At neither hearing did a witness testify as to his or her
personal knowledge of the alleged misconduct.2 5 The employer
instead offered "a considerable amount" of documentary evidence
describing the misconduct, which was accepted by the presiding
officers.216
On appeal to the circuit court, Judge Cablin noted that section
60.2-623(A) excused the VEC from conformity with rules of evidence,
under common law or statute, in its hearings.2 1 Moreover, Judge
Cablin referred to Baker v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.21" as authority for
the proposition that such hearsay evidence is admissible.219 Because
the Postal Service documents were admissible and contained
statements supporting the employer's allegations of misconduct, the
court had sufficient evidence to sustain the VEC's decision adverse
to Powell.220
Since Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,221 the courts have disputed
whether a record consisting exclusively of hearsay evidence is
sufficient to sustain an agency's adjudicative decision on appeal. In
Carroll, the New York Court of Appeals set aside an award of
workers' compensation that was based solely on the claimant's
210. 45 Va. Cir. 149 (Loudoun County 1998).
211. See id. at 149.
212. VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-625 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
213. See Powell, 45 Va. Cir. at 149.




218. 11 Va. App. 419, 399 S.E.2d 630 (Ct. App. 1990).
219. See Powell, 45 Va. Cir. at 150.
220. See id. at 152.
221. 113 N.E. 507 (N.Y. 1916).
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statement, made before he died, that he was injured on the job.222 As
far as the court was concerned, even where the rules of evidence did
not govern an administrative hearing, the ensuing decision could not
be said to be supported by substantial evidence without "a residuum
of legal evidence."223 Although the "legal residuum" rule has been
called into question with great frequency, it remains the rule in
many states, while some jurisdictions insist upon the rule at least in
those cases where rights protected by due process are at stake.2
The position of Virginia courts on this matter is not clear. The
singular standard in section 60.2-625 for review of the sufficiency of
the basis for VEC claims adjudications surely limits the relevance of
Powell for courts reviewing other types of decisions by administrative
agencies. According to section 60.2-675, VEC findings of fact are
conclusive "if supported by the evidence and in the absence of
fraud."2 5 By contrast, agency findings of fact subject to judicial
review under the APA are assessed for "the substantiality of their
evidential support."226Apparently not raised in this appeal was the
closely related question of whether, regardless of the rules of
evidence, an agency's reliance on hearsay denied the defendant her
right of confrontation. In Baker, the court held that a claimant was
not denied his right to cross-examine a witness who submitted a
written statement because the claimant could have subpoenaed her
or otherwise pursued cross-examination, but did not.22 7
H. Time's Up, You Win
In 1993, the General Assembly amended article 3 of the APA by
imposing deadlines for decisions by agencies in administrative
cases.22 1 Where the case was assigned by a board or commission to a
hearing officer, the board or commission had thirty days from its
222. See id. at 508.
223. Id. at 509.
224. See generally DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 179, at § 10.4 (1994). The rule is no longer
applied in New York, however. See 300 Gravatai Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights,
379 N.E.2d 1183 (N.Y. 1978).
225. VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-625 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
226. Id. § 9-6.14:17 (Repl. Vol. 1998). See Robinson v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, No.
1114-85, 1986 WL 400468, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 1986) (unreported decision).
227. See Baker v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 11 Va. App. 419,427,399 S.E.2d 630,634-35 (Ct.
App. 1990). "If claimant did not enjoy the right of confrontation and cross-examination or any
of the other rights available to him under the laws and regulations, it was not because they
were denied him; it was, insofar as the record discloses, only because he did not pursue them."
Id.; see also Klimko v. Virginia Employment Comm., 216 Va. 750,762-63,222 S.E.2d 559,569-
70 (1976).
228. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:11 to -6.14:14 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cur. Supp. 1999).
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receipt of the hearing officer's report to issue a final decision.229
Where the board or commission itself presided at a formal hearing,
the board or commission had thirty days to issue a final decision.30
In cases where no formal hearing occurred, the board or commission
had ninety days "from the date of the informal fact-finding proceed-
ing" to issue a final decisionY 1 Later deadlines could be substituted
by agreement of the named party and the agency. 232 Consequently,
the board's or commission's failure to issue a final decision within
the applicable time frame resulted in a decision that was deemed to
be in favor of the named party. 3 3 Thus, if a board or commission, for
good reason or bad, took more than ninety days to adjudicate a
license or permit application, renewal, suspension, or revocation, the
APA directed judgment in favor of the license holder or applicant.
In Rizzo v. Virginia Retirement System,234 the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that, in a case in which no formal hearing occurs, the
decision clock begins running from the day of an informal conference
and is not tolled thereafter while the agency gathers additional
factsY.5
In Rizzo, a former teacher and high school principal applied for
disability retirement benefits from the Virginia Retirement System
(VRS") .236 At an informal fact-finding conference on April 25, 1995,
the claimant offered the testimony of his psychiatrist regarding his
condition.2 7 Almost a month later, after the testimony had been
transcribed, the presiding Agency representative sent the transcript
to VRS, requesting that it be reviewed by the Medical Board for
comment.23 8 VRS received the transcript on May 24, 1995 and
forwarded it on June 19, 1995 to the Medical Board. 39 On July 11,
1995, VRS received from the Medical Board a request for permission
to forward the evidence to a consulting psychiatrist, which was
229. See id. §§ 9-6.14:11(E), :12(H) (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
230. See id. § 9-6.14:12(G) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
231. Id. § 9-6.14:11(D) (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
232. See id. §§ 9-6.14:11(D), :11(E), :12(F), :12(G) (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
233. See id.
234. 255 Va. 375, 497 S.E.2d 852 (1998).
235. See id. at 382-83,497 S.E.2d at 856. -'Agency' means any authority, instrumentality,
officer, board or other unit of the state government empowered by the basic laws to make
regulations or decide cases." VA. CODEANN. § 9-6.14:4 (Repl. Vol. 1998). The fact that Virginia
Retirement System ("VRS") is subject to the APA did not give the supreme court pause. See
Rizzo, 255 Va. at 380, 497 S.E.2d at 855.
236. See Rizzo, 255 Va. at 378, 497 S.E.2d at 853.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 378-79, 497 S.E.2d at 853-54.
239. See id.
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granted by VRS on July 26, 1995.240 The Medical Board sent the
evidence to the consultant psychiatrist on August 21, 1995, and
returned the psychiatrist's report, adopted as the Medical Board's
own, to VRS on September 27, 1995.241 VRS delivered it to the
presiding representative on October 4, 1995, and he made his
recommendation to VRS on November 6, 1995.242
Meanwhile, on August 11, 1995, the claimant reminded VRS that
because more than ninety days passed since the informal fact-finding
conference, a decision was due.243 VRS acknowledged this on August
21, 1995, and the claimant again reminded VRS on September 27,
1995.244 Finally, the claimant notified VRS on October 6, 1995 that,
according to the APA, the lapse of more than ninety days since the
informal fact-finding conference, together with his previous reminder
to the agency, resulted in a decision in the claimant's favor. 5 The
agency responded on November 6, 1995 by issuing its final decision
denying the claimant disability retirement benefits. 6 By this time,
195 days had passed since the informal fact-finding conference.
The claimant appealed to the Orange County Circuit Court, which
granted his motion for summary judgment. 8 The Virginia Court of
Appeals reversed, however, interpreting the statutory deadline as
running from the end of the fact-finding phase, which in cases
proceeding in accordance with section 9-6.14:11, does not necessarily
coincide with the adjournment of the informal conference or
hearing.2 49 The court relied on the Reviser's Note for section 9-
6.14:11 in concluding that informal fact-finding under that section
could include not only the conference, but also such subsequent
consultation by the fact-finder as the issues may require.2 ° In this
instance, therefore, the General Assembly did not intend for the
clock to begin running until VRS received the Medical Board's report.
Measured in this way, the final decision by VRS adverse to the
claimant was timely.






246. See id. at 379-80, 497 S.E.2d at 854.






The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the court of appeals, but
not without division.25' In an opinion by Justice Kinser, the court
held that the fact-finding proceeding referred to in section 9-
6.14:11(D), to which the deadline applied, was nothing more than the
informal conference or consultation proceedings referred to in section
9-6.14:11(A).25 2 The supreme court found this interpretation to be in
accord with the ordinary meaning of the phrase, and thought that
the alternative reading by the court of appeals left an agency in
control of the timing of its decisions, thereby frustrating the carefully
designed time constraints in the statute.25 Chief Justice Carrico
dissented, joined by Justices Compton and Hassell.254 For the
dissenters, a court's obligation to assume that when the General
Assembly uses different words in the same act, the General Assem-
bly means two different things meant that a fact-finding proceeding
under section 9-6.14:11(D) must be something different from a fact-
finding conference or consultation in section 9-6.14:11(A).2 ' A fact-
finding proceeding could therefore include fact-finding after the
conference or consultation, such as reference to the Medical Board
and its expert, especially when the organic law of the VRS obliged
the Medical Board to pass on medical evidence of the sort proffered
by the claimant at the conference on April 25, 1995.256
This case and its background invite serious consideration of the
implications of the case decision according to certain deadlines
imposed by the General Assembly in chapter 3 of the APA. Even if
an administrative agency might now and then act with less than
optimal speed in reaching a case decision, the appropriate response
is not a general foreclosure to decision making whenever the process
takes more than ninety days.257 In this case, the claimant received
251. See id. at 378-85, 497 S.E.2d at 853-57.
252. See id. at 382, 497 S.E.2d at 855-56.
253. See id. at 382, 497 S.E.2d at 856.
254. See id. at 385, 497 S.E.2d at 857 (Carrico, C.J., dissenting).
255. See id.
256. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.1-124.23, -156 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
257. Cf. Carter v. Ancel, 28 Va. App. 76, 79, 502 S.E.2d 149, 151 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.6(E)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1999), which required Child Protective
Services to decide whether an abuse complaint was founded within 45 days was merely
directive, so that the agency's jurisdiction was not lost when the deadline passed). The court
inAncel applied the general rule referred to in Caccioppo v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 534,
537, 458 S.E.2d 592, 594 (Ct. App. 1995), that the word "shall" in a statute addressed to a
public official is to be taken as directory, not mandatory, unless a contrary intent is
manifested by the General Assembly. See Ancel, 28 Va. App. at 79, 502 S.E.2d at 151. The
1993 amendments to article 3 of the APA surely ought to qualify as examples of the
manifestation of an intent by the General Assembly that those deadlines be taken as
mandatory.
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a disability pension, whether he deserved it or not, only because the
VRS failed to act in accordance with a time table arbitrarily imposed
by the legislature. If the claimant did qualify for a pension under the
retirement law, then the public interest was coincidentally served,
albeit after delay and inconvenience to a deserving applicant. Even
if the claimant did not qualify for a pension, then the harm from this
arbitrary award was not serious, purely monetary, and probably not
very grand. The deadlines imposed on a case decided in article 3 of
the APA, however, do not apply only to an agency considering
disability pensions. Indeed, only the State Water Control Board and
the Department of Environmental Quality are exempted, and then
only to the extent necessary for compliance with the federal Clean
Water and Clean Air Acts."' Consider the implications for Virginia's
environment had the supremacy of federal laws not imposed on the
General Assembly to make these two exceptions. Regardless of the
merits of their applications, applicants for permits to discharge or
pollute would win the right to discharge or pollute any time the
agency missed a deadline.5 9 Other agencies licensing for the safety
of the public are not protected by federal supremacy from these
deadlines on case decision, including those agencies who issue,
suspend, or revoke licenses for the professions, including medicine
and teaching. The public's stake is surely high in a case for revoca-
tion of the license of a bad doctor or a bad teacher, and it is the
public that suffers, not the agency, when it fails to meet one of these
statutory deadlines, for good cause or otherwise. Indeed, the
claimant in Rizzo could have been contesting not a pension, but the
loss of his teaching license. In his claim for disability, the claimant
asserted that his depression manifested itself in the course of school
board proceedings, which resulted in his termination on grounds of
improper conduct, sexual harassment, unprofessional behavior, and
employee discrimination.26 °
258. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:11(D), :11(E), :12(G), :12(H) (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum.
Supp. 1999).
259. The deadlines are subject to extension only in the event the hearing officer or (when
a board or commission itself conducts a fact-finding conference or hearing) a member of the
board or commission suffers sickness, disability, or termination. Id. §§ 9-6.14:11(F), :12(I)
(Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 1999). There is no mention of other reasons that ordinarily
amount to good cause.
260. See Rizzo v. Virginia Retirement Sys., No. 1054-93-2, 1994 WL 369722, at *1 (Va. CL
App. 1994) (unreported decision). The claimant has since been prosecuted twice on charges
based on a woman's accusation that he raped and sexually assaulted her hundreds of times
over several years, beginning when she was ten years old. See Mistrial for Ex-Principal:
Second Jury Deadlocks on Rape Charges, WASH. POST, May 30, 1999, at C2.
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When an adjudicative case seems to take too long, the appropriate
response is something other than a blunt instrument of the sort
afforded by the 1993 amendments to chapter 3 of the APA. Precisely
because their facts and circumstances so distinguish them from one
another, disputes are treated as cases and decided one by one. What
may be unjustifiable delay in one case may be no more than the time
necessary for considered decision making in light of the comparative
complexity of another. It might be that a careful study of the time
spent on a particular type of case warrants articulating a presump-
tive span of time in which a decision of that sort ought to be made.
However, the 1993 amendments are not founded on such careful
research, nor are they tailored to the variety of issues that compli-
cate some types of case decisions more than others. Even if a
presumptive span could be derived for disability pension applica-
tions, for example, an interest in timely decision making ought to
produce preemptive consequences that are discretionary rather than
summary. Good cause should excuse failure to conform to a model
timetable. Such a scheme would not be revolutionary; indeed its
contours have been with us for centuries, and called into play
whenever a court is petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel a
decision wrongfully delayed. The appropriate remedy for apparent
dilatoriness on the part of administrative adjudicators is a writ of
mandamus. It affords a remedy, but only after the interest of the
complaining party in a prompt decision is balanced against that of
the public in a careful one. Moreover, this balancing is performed by
ajudge, experienced in the craft of adjudicative decision making, and
the sanction, where necessary, jeopardizes the unjustifiably tardy
decision makers rather than the public interest.261 If the General
Assembly cannot stand aside, then its legislative responses ought to
be better tailored, agency specific, and fashioned so that they
jeopardize the interests of procrastinating agency trustees and not
those of the public beneficiaries for whom those board members and
commissioners serve.262 There could, for example, be a price ex-
261. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. See generally KENT SINCLAIR & LEIGH B.
MIDDLEDIrCH, JR., VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3(A) (3d ed. 1998).
262. A hearing officer who is not an agency employee may be removed for cause from the
list of those qualified to preside in formal adjudications. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(E)
(Cum. Supp. 1999). A continuous pattern of untimely decisions is cause for removal, as is
failure to render decisions within statutory time frames. See Hearing Officer System Rules
ofAdministration, Rule 4(A)(2)(a) (unpublished) (on file with the University ofRichmondLaw
Review).
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tracted for dilatoriness, much as a price is paid for continuing
contempt. 3
I Expert, By Act of the Assembly
In Groome Transportation, Inc. v. Virginia Department of Motor
Vehicles,264 two competitors challenged a decision by DMV awarding
a certificate of public convenience and necessity for limousine service
to a third company. 5 After the Richmond City Circuit Court
affirmed DMV's decision, the competitors appealed, arguing among
other things that the circuit court misapplied the standard of review
provided in the APA for such cases.266 According to section 9-6.14:17
of the APA, a court reviewing findings made by an agency "is limited
to ascertaining whether there was substantial evidence" to justify
the agency's findings.267 Therefore, the court must "take due account
of the presumption of official regularity, the experience and special-
ized competence of the agency."26' Appellants argued that DMV
lacked the relevant experience and specialized competence that
justifies judicial deference because the case was decided less than a
year after the General Assembly transferred the authority to issue
limousine licenses to DMV.269
The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit
court was correct to ignore DMV's lack of experience with issues like
those in this case. As far as the court of appeals was concerned, any
question of DMV's competence was resolved by the General Assembly
when it assigned the power to decide these issues to DMV.2 1' The
court offered no authority or precedent to support its conclusion, and
it exudes a distinct air of circularity. A reviewing court is obliged by
the General Assembly to take account of the experience and
specialized competency of an agency, but an agency is presumed to
have experience and specialized competency on the sole ground that
the General Assembly afforded it the relevant jurisdiction in the first
263. Federal disbursing officers are held personally liable for shortcomings in their
accounts. See 31 U.S.C. § 3528 (1994). In some cases, "the Comptroller General may relieve
a present or former accountable official or agent of an agency responsible for the physical loss
or deficiency of public money." Id. § 3527.
264. 27 Va. App. 682, 500 S.E.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1998).
265. See id. at 686, 500 S.E.2d at 854.
266. See id.
267. Id.
268. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cure. Supp. 1999).
269. See Groome Transp., 27 Va. App. at 687,500 S.E.2d at 854 (citing Act ofApril 6,1995,
chs. 744 & 803, 1995 VA. AcTs 1267, 1554).
270. See id. at 696, 500 S.E.2d at 858-59.
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place. There seems, by this interpretation, little work left in the
clause for the humble word "due." It seems, rather, that the charge
to reviewing courts in section 9-6.14:17 to take due account of the
experience and specialized competence of the agency is a charge
simply to defer. There is no continuum of fact-finding expertise "out
there" from which to derive varying degrees of judicial deference, as
the circumstances might otherwise suggest." 1
It is fashionable these days for legislatures to insist that one or
more members of a board or commission with regulatory powers be
an ordinary member of the public with no previous connection or
experience relevant to the regulated profession, business sector, or
industry.2 It will be interesting to see how a court will take due
account of the expertise and experience of such a board when an
issue of fact is resolved through a close vote, in which the vote of a
citizen member is determinative.
271. When the focus is on the factual question, rather than on the administrative decider,
the court of appeals has recognized a wider latitude for reviewing courts in the same clause
of section 9-6.14:17. See Johnston-Willis, Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231, 243-44, 369 S.E.2d
1, 8 (Ct. App. 1988) (f[Tlhe degree of deference afforded an agency decision depends upon not
only the nature of the issue, legal or factual, but also upon whether the issue falls within the
area of 'experience and specialized competence of the agency'); Williams v. Virginia
Manufactured Hous. Bd., 47 Va. Cir. 426 (Rockingham County 1998).272. Se e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-37.3 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1999) ("The
[Judicial Ifquiry and Review) Commission shall consist of threejudicial members... and two
public members who shall not be active or retired judges and shall never have been licensed
lawyers."); id. § 46.2-1503(B) (Repl. Vol. 1998) ("One member [of the Motor Vehicle Dealers
Board] must be an individual who has no direct or indirect interest, other than as a consumer,
in or relating to the motor vehicle industry.").
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